This primer reviews the legal and functional understandings regarding explosive remnants of
war, particularly after the adoption of Protocol V in the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons.1 It examines the tensions between the legal definition of ERW and the reality on
the ground, and recommends clarifying the terms that bind post-conflict clearance efforts
to ensure the greatest effectiveness of those campaigns.

Working Toward a Definition of ERW
Prior to November 2003, there was no formal legal definition for
ERW. It was often treated as a synonym for unexploded ordnance,
which the International Mine Action Standards have defined as “explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise
prepared for use or used. It may have been fired, dropped, launched
or projected yet remains unexploded either through malfunction or
design or for any other reason.”2 The IMAS define explosive ordnance as “all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials, biological and chemical agents.”3
The IMAS definition of explosive ordnance presents a more extensive scope of munitions 4 than most groups involved with mine/
ERW clearance would use, as it encompasses nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons. A more pragmatic explanation of ERW is exemplified in an International Review of the Red Cross article, which included in its definition of unexploded munitions “anti-personnel
mines, which are widely prohibited, as well as anti-vehicle mines,
submunitions from airborne cluster bombs or land-based systems
and other unexploded ordnance.”5 In general, the term ERW was
open for interpretation regarding what munitions or ordnance
might be included, and entailed anything from APMs to submunitions or “other UXO.”
Pressure for legal regulation of ERW under humanitarian law has
been spearheaded primarily by the International Committee of the
Red Cross, Landmine Action U.K. and the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining. In particular, cluster-bomb
submunitions 6 have been of increasing concern. In a 2000 study on
Kosovo, the ICRC reported that cluster bomblets had an estimated
overall failure rate of between 10 and 15 percent.7 Landmine Action
U.K. reported that in Kosovo between 1999 and 2001, while landmines
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hile using weapons during a conflict is a military decision,
modern combat operations have introduced a dilemma:
what to do with explosive remnants of war that remain
after a conflict ends. Such weapons not only threaten the post-conflict
safety of civilians and military personnel but can also be a major impediment to economic development. This primer on ERW provides
an overview of the changing definition of ERW, reports what is currently included in the term ERW and argues that the way ahead for
post-conflict stabilization and development will require a clarification
and agreement on those terms if the challenge is answered effectively.
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caused about 13 percent of civilian deaths,
unexploded cluster-bomb submunitions
proved a larger threat, contributing to almost 32 percent of deaths.8 Some observed
that the likelihood of munitions malfunction was increasing through “the rapidly
expanding use of mass-produced cluster
munitions, the increased reliance on highly
sensitive micro-electronics in munitions and
fuses, and quality-control problems in the
defense industry.”9
Proponents for international regulation
of ERW advocated the addition of a protocol to the 1980 Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons to address humanitarian concerns. After over a year of discussion and preparation, CCW Protocol V
was adopted Nov. 28, 2003. Protocol V
requires states to clear future ERW and to
work together to “clear existing unexploded ordnance or abandoned ammunition,
which can already be found in more than

Anti-personnel blast mine.

80 countries.”10,11 This includes taking all
feasible precautions to protect civilians from
ERW dangers as well as recording and sharing post-conflict ERW location information
for clearance.
While not yet in force, Switzerland
and Liechtenstein recently deposited instruments of ratification on May 12, 2006
to reach the necessary 20 States Parties
consenting to be bound to Protocol V. As
a result, Protocol V will now enter into
force as a legally binding accord by the
end of this year, on Nov. 12, 2006. Since
then, countries have continued to ratify
this Protocol.12

Submunition.

A Legal Definition of ERW
Protocol V presents a legal precedent
for defining explosive remnants of war. It

defines ERW as “unexploded ordnance and
abandoned explosive ordnance.”13 Protocol
V defines UXO using the IMAS’ standard
definition as previously cited; thus the first
part of this new legal definition of ERW
differs little from older understandings
of ERW-as-UXO. However, Protocol V’s
definition of ERW provides two important
modifications to popular understanding
of ERW-as-UXO.
The first noteworthy aspect is the second
part of the legal ERW definition, as “abandoned explosive ordnance.” Protocol V defines AXO as “explosive ordnance that has
not been used during an armed conflict,
that has been left behind or dumped by a
party to an armed conflict, and which is no
longer under control of the party that left it
behind or dumped it. Abandoned explosive
ordnance may or may not have been primed,
fused, armed or otherwise prepared for
use.”13 This means that not only can ERW

of mines, booby traps and other devices as
defined in Protocol II of this Convention
as amended on 3 May 1996.”13 This
means that mines, including APMs15 and
AVMs,16,17 booby traps and manually emplaced munitions/other devices18  including
improvised explosive devices19 are excluded
from Protocol V on ERW and legally are
not defined as ERW. APMs also legally
fall under the jurisdiction of the widely ratified Ottawa Convention’s regulations.15
Practical Application of ERW
as Legally Defined
International humanitarian law has now
codified a definition of ERW, obliging States
Parties that have ratified Protocol V to act on
the resultant legal requirements of clearance.
Meanwhile, what does ERW functionally
mean? When organizations and clearance
teams are working to “remove ERW,” what
are they actually clearing on the ground?
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Anti-personnel blast mine, commonly known as a “butterfly mine.”

be understood traditionally as resulting
from the failure of weapons (UXO), but it
can also be understood as weapons that were
not used at all. AXO may range from “a few
rounds of ammunition or a grenade left with
the body of a dead soldier to entire ammunition dumps abandoned (frequently in a great
hurry) by a retreating force.”14
The second important caveat is that
even as CCW Protocol V legally defines
what ERW is, it also specifically states what
ERW is not, due to separate obligation under CCW Amended Protocol II. When defining the jurisdiction under which the term
ERW can now be applied in international
humanitarian law, Protocol V defines explosive ordnance (the common characteristic of all ERW) as “conventional munitions
containing explosives, with the exception

There is not a prevailing depiction of what
actual physical ordnance is considered to be
“explosive remnants of war” or how ERW
clearance should be managed. Herein resides a potentially problematic gap between
an understanding of ERW with regard to
legal obligations for clearance and an understanding of effective clearance operations.
In attempting to understand a practical
definition of ERW more acutely, this article
examines an analytical model published
by the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining in 2001 and 2002.
Rather than focusing on a legal or technical
definition of ERW, the GICHD examined
ERW in practical terms of what might present an “explosive threat in post-conflict environments”20 and explicitly argued that ERW
was a broader term than simply UXO. The
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Table 1. Examples of UXO that can be considered ERW under
Protocol V.
This highlights a core tension between the functional and legal understanding of ERW because, although ERW does not legally
include mines, they are still highly explosive munitions, a danger
to civilians and military personnel, and functionally an explosive
remnant of war. Additionally, Protocol V does not include chemical, biological or nuclear weapons and ordnance; however, many of
the possible types of UXO listed in Table 1 such as warheads and
grenades might very well have such properties, again presenting existence of a practical interrelatedness of weapons both included and
not included in Protocol V.
Abandoned armored fighting vehicles. The GICHD describes
explosive ordnance disposal of abandoned AFVs23 in a defensive
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Anti-tank mine.

position as “one of the most technically complex and demanding operations conducted by an EOD technician” due to threat components
of surrounding mines/UXO, depleted uranium fragments, explosive
reactive armor, unstable stocks of internally stowed ammunition and
access denial devices.21 With these explosive threats present, abandoned AFVs are functionally considered ERW. The international
legal definition of ERW would also apSmall-arms
pear to identify AFVs as ERW, though
ammunition
again with the exception of mines
surrounding the AFV or any booby
Submunitions
traps or improvised explosive devices, as they are all codified in CCW
Surface-to-air
Amended Protocol II. Additionally,
missiles
AFVs are only legally considered ERW
once they are abandoned by the user
Tank ammunition
party as AXO and only if they have
explosive properties.
Torpedoes
Small arms and light weapons.
SALW and their ammunition can be
Unmanned aerial
vehicles
functionally understood as ERW due
to their potential instability through
Warheads
aging and improper/unregulated maintenance, leading to explosions. The
GICHD defines SALW as “all lethal
conventional munitions that can be
carried by an individual combatant or
a light vehicle, and that also do not require a substantial logistical and
maintenance capability.”21,24 Danger lies in leaking explosive content
and degradation of fuse safety systems and propellant stabilizer.20 The
international legal definition of ERW would allow inclusion of SALW
with the exception again of any mines, booby traps or improvised
explosive devices that might be carried and so long as the SALW are
not being carried by state actors for official use.
Stockpiles of ammunition and explosives. Stockpiles and
caches25 of ammunition or explosives present a practical ERW threat
through the danger of explosion, which can be devastating if poor
storage conditions lead to leaks or sudden movements resulting in
spontaneous combustion. In one example, a January 2002 explosion
at a government ammunition depot in Lagos, Nigeria, resulted in
over 1,000 deaths.26 Legally, if stockpiles are understood to be under

Tension between Legal and
Functional Definitions
The existence of a tension between legal and functional definitions of ERW
quickly becomes clear when examining
the “exceptions”—mines, booby traps and
IEDs/other devices—to ERW as it is legally
defined. The pattern found when comparing ERW as explosive threat with ERW by
legal definition reflects a paradoxical reality: while mines, booby traps and IEDs
cannot be legally included in Protocol V
as ERW, practically they are all highly explosive. The philosophical argument that
mines are “different” from UXO and AXO
because when exploded they have fulfilled
their function (as opposed to failing to explode [UXO] or never being used [AXO])
does not carry over with any importance
into functional clearance in a post-conflict
setting. For example, mines can be found
on the ground amidst other UXO, may be
emplaced around AFVs, and can be stored
within stockpiles. Because mines are highly
explosive, they must be treated with the
same concern, precision and technical skill
as any legally defined ERW.
An additional tension relates to the
function of weapons and the timing of
their use. For example, if booby traps and
IEDs remain after a conflict and are rigged
to detonate explosive ordnance, can they
be considered abandoned ordnance and, by
definition, ERW? If a civilian is injured by
an abandoned explosive booby trap or IED
left by retreating forces, are they a victim of
the ongoing conflict or rather of an explosive
remnant of that conflict? Ultimately, even if
they aren’t “legally” defined as ERW under
Protocol V, booby traps and IEDs present
the same risk of explosion and the same need
for effective and successful clearance.
These tensions are of interest not for
semantic reasons but out of practical concern. What becomes clear is that the physical explosive threat of mines, UXO, AXO,
booby traps and IEDs/other devices cannot
be separated from each other on the ground,
despite a separation within legal jurisdiction
of international humanitarian law. Provision
of assistance in clearance and clean-up is required by both CCW Protocol V and the
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national control, they would not be defined
as ERW as they are not abandoned; caches,
if understood to be ordnance stored by nonstate actors and then abandoned, could be
considered ERW and might include any explosive ordnance except mines, booby traps
and IEDs. The key is that they are explosive
and not under the control of the party that
left them behind or dumped them.
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GICHD divided the explosive threat of ERW into four major areas
that are useful as a framework to understand better what ordnance
might realistically be included in ERW risk:
1. Mine and UXO contamination of the ground
2. Abandoned armored fighting vehicles
3. Small arms and light weapons, including limited ammunition
and explosives in the possession of civilians and non-state
actors
4. Abandoned and/or damaged/disrupted stockpiles of
ammunition and explosives21
The GICHD’s model lists what it considers to be the ERW of
primary concern based on potential on-the-ground explosive hazards.
How does a definition of ERW as it is functionally understood compare to the new legal definition of ERW in international humanitarian law? The relationship between practical and legal understandings of explosive remnants of war will be compared by looking at
the GICHD’s four specific types of ERW understood to be potential
explosive threat.
Mines and unexploded weapons ground contamination. One
aspect of on-the-ground ERW contamination is UXO (as defined by
the IMAS). However, at the time of publication, both AP and AV
mines were also included in the GICHD’s identification of ERW,
due to the highly explosive nature of these weapons. Table 1 lists an
array of potential UXO that might be found on the ground after a
conflict.22 However, under Protocol V, APMs and AVMs are no longer legally defined as ERW as they are codified separately and exclusively in CCW Amended Protocol II or the Ottawa Convention;
thus, mines are not included in Table 1.

A small, aerial-dispensed, impact-fired, anti-personnel fragmentation bomb.

Ottawa Convention, and there is the need
for greatest efficiency in order to best protect
and serve human lives at risk. This requires
coordination, sharing of information and
collaborative expertise.
One potential pitfall will be if the clearance efforts of mines, booby traps, IEDs
and ERW aren’t coordinated because
their jurisdiction under humanitarian law
doesn’t technically require carry-over of
specific duties anywhere outside that specific legal mandate. For example, clearance of landmines is required through the
Ottawa Convention while clearance of
ERW is required through CCW Protocol
V. Humanitarian law provides the regulation of clearance within each convention
or protocol, but there is no guarantee that
effective clearance efforts will be wellcoordinated between signatory parties of
these separate legal agreements.

Future Action Toward ERW
Eradication
Many groups still deal pragmatically with
mines and other UXO together. For example,
the U.S. government includes in its definition
of ERW “landmines, UXO and abandoned
ammunition caches,” and in its humanitarian mine-action program it “strives to reduce
the social, economic and environmental impact of landmines, unexploded ordnance and
small arms ammunition.”27  Within the United
Nations, mine action is coordinated primarily
under the U.N. Mine Action Service and includes “all activities geared towards addressing
the problems faced by populations as a result of
landmine contamination”; however, despite its
name, it is understood that U.N. mine action
“also addresses all forms of UXO.”28
Even so, the reality is that despite some
inclusion of UXO and AXO in mine-action
clearance activities, they have not yet had

10.1 | august | 2006 | journal of mine action | feature |  53  

and the need for global clearance in the same
way that the Ottawa Convention did for
landmines. However, if ERW is to join the
ranks of priority with landmines, the need to
combine and coordinate education, identification, information management, research,
and clearance efforts between landmines
and ERW should become imperative.
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A new set of playing cards are raising awareness and
recognition of common landmines and explosives encountered
globally. The cards help adults and children in mine-affected
regions learn more about mines and how to identify them.
Each card carries the image of a frequently encountered
mine, its country of origin, type and basic munitions
details. The back of the cards carries a “DANGER: MINES”
sign. Attention has been paid to consistency and correlation
between suits: Clubs are anti-tank mines, diamonds are
anti-personnel mines with the lowest metal content, hearts
are AP mines with enough metal to make them detectable,
and spades are fragmentation mines capable of injuring at
great distances.
In many cases, the card number relates directly to mine
designation. Jokers are two of the most common and sensitive
submunitions, BLU-97 and M42-type. In addition to being used
in normal card play, the cards also are predisposed to “top
trumps,” a game in which a mine category is used to determine
supremacy. For example, players will designate a
category, such as diameter, to specify highest
and lowest value in winning. In doing
so, players, especially children,
absorb technical details easily.
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Conclusion
This article serves to clarify definitions
of ERW by examining legal and functional
understandings. At the same time, how the
international community, governments,
organizations and individuals choose to
respond to ERW is of keen interest. As the
legal definition of ERW becomes more limited, excluding mines, booby traps and IEDs
from its mandate, it challenges us to increase
the functional coordination among various
explosive elements remaining after conflict
in both research and cleanup efforts. Our
challenge will be to understand and apply legal requirements that enforce commitment
to cleanup of all explosive ordnance, from
ERW as legally defined (including UXO,
AFVs, SALW and caches) to mines, booby
traps, IEDs and other devices. Ultimately,
defining ERW should not create regression
or obfuscation in clearance projects, but
rather provide stronger clarity, which allows
us to consider all pertinent aspects of postconflict munitions threats.
For additional references for this article,
please visit http://maic.jmu.edu /feature /
ressler/ressler.htm/#addlrefs.
See Endnotes, page 111

Mine-Recognition Cards Teach Adults, Children

A deck of cards is £7.05, inclusive of VAT where applicable
(approximately US$9.05); shipping rates are determined based
on destination. The company also
offers a database of more than
10,000 mine and ordnance images and can tailor card decks to
specific needs.
For more information on the
cards or to place an order, visit
www.ckingassociates.co.uk.
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efforts need to be effective. This will require coordination between mine and ERW
policy and practice, development of a deeper
understanding of the relationship between
mines and ERW and a greater commitment
to understanding ERW (as it is now legally
defined) in its own right. Practical questions
arise in terms of best practice. For example,
is it more effective to have one EOD team
working to clear both mines and ERW, or
should they be cleared separately to work
within their legally separate mandates (or
separate funding)? If mines and other functional ERW are cleared by separate groups,
should it be at the same time? How can governments, organizations and workers share
decision-making and coordination roles?
Will relevant information be quickly and correctly shared and recorded between groups?
As the legal scope and responsibility for
ERW clearance become more exclusively
defined under CCW Protocol V, there is
increased need for policy and coordination
to improve overall clearance efforts between
the legal jurisdictions of mines, booby traps/
IEDs and ERW. There is also the hope that
as ERW clearance becomes its own legal jurisdiction of concern, it will receive a boost
in global awareness and priority.
Because Protocol V regarding ERW will
not be put into force until Nov. 12, 2006,
yet it is not clear how agencies and governments will address the problem and clearance of ERW. States Parties must first decide
to ratify the Protocol, and then follow its
dictates. Protocol V may succeed in increasing awareness of the deadly threats of ERW
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the popular attention that APMs have garnered, nor have they been understood and
researched as extensively as APMs have
been. This is due largely to the strength and
success of the Ottawa Convention, which
has provided far more financial support,
research and political pressure toward ridding countries of the scourge of landmines
than toward ERW. If the goal is to eradicate ERW with the same inspiring success as
landmines, stronger policy is needed to ensure ERW receive the same level of concern
and action as landmines, and that clearance
of various explosive threats, including ERW,
mines, booby traps and IEDs, is coordinated and focused on with equal priority.
It was only in 2004, for example, that the
U.S. Department of Defense obtained a
change of its legislative authority to broaden
its humanitarian mine-action efforts to include ERW, 29 showing that for many, the
prioritization of ERW clearance is still in
early stages.
Presently, there is no agreement on what
specific ordnance is included in the framework of UXO and AXO. The GICHD
notes that since there is no common standard for reporting post-conflict casualties
and the type of explosive ordnance cleared,
there is not even an “accurate and objective
assessment of the impact of specific types
of UXO.”21 In particular, injuries can be
misreported, resulting in a skewed picture
of the source of casualties from functional
ERW. For example, a leg injury may have
occurred through a submunition, but was
recorded as an anti-personnel injury due to
the popular focus on landmines or lack of
concrete data and knowledge of UXO and
AXO in contrast to familiarity with landmines. An important first step, then, is additional research about and standardized
identification of weapons and munitions
remaining after a conflict to provide accurate reporting, measuring and understanding of ERW incidence.
Additionally, the GICHD argues in particular for a “system to allow a global overview of casualties caused by specific types
of ERW” with reports including not only
generic type but also condition (blind/dud,
field storage, rigged as IED or booby trap).21
Such an understanding of ERW functionally includes mines, booby traps and IEDs
along with the aforementioned UXO and
AXO, because in order to comprehensively
assess the incidence and scope of deadly munitions, the analysis must include all explosive munitions.
The understanding of threats and incidence of post-conflict casualties needs to be
improved, and clearance and risk-education
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